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A BRIEF ILLUSTRATED CHRONICLE
OF RETROACTIVE COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION
Robert Brauneis*
At least since the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Eldred v.
Ashcroft,1 it has been widely known that whenever Congress has
extended copyright term, it has done so retroactively, granting the
benefit of the extension to all works still under copyright on the
effective date of the extension.2 However, I have never found succinct,
complete tables and charts detailing the periods during which works
received various copyright terms given the retroactive effect of all
extension legislation.3 It is the modest aim of this article to provide
*
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1
537 U.S. 186 (2003).
2
See, e.g., id. at 200 (“History reveals an unbroken congressional practice of granting to
authors of works with existing copyrights the benefit of term extensions so that all
under copyright protection will be governed evenhandedly under the same regime”);
id. at 237 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“To be sure, Congress, at many times in its history,
has retroactively extended the terms of existing copyrights and patents.”); Tyler
Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution: An Historical
Perspective, 49 J. Copyright Soc’y 19, 26-46 (2001) (discussing retroactive extension
of copyright term by means of general laws).
3
Laura Gasaway and Peter Hirtle have provided useful charts detailing when works
pass into the public domain. See Laura Gasaway, When U.S. Works Pass into the
Public Domain, http://www.unc.edu/~unclng/public-d.htm (last visited May 3, 2015);
Peter B. Hirtle, Copyright Term and the Public Domain in the United States,
https://copyright.cornell.edu/resources/publicdomain.cfm (last visited May 3, 2015).
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that information, and to provide some examples of the operation of
retroactive term extension.
Although this article does not advance any particular thesis on
the subject of copyright terms, as an enticement to read further I will
suggest that chronicling the reach of retroactive copyright term
extension not only helps to figure out when particular works entered
the public domain, but leads to some interesting general observations.
For example, it may not have previously struck many that July 1, 1867 is
a significant date in copyright history, and yet it is, because it is the last
date on which copyright term expectations coincided with copyright
term reality. Those who acquired federal copyright protection for their
works on July 1, 1867 expected to get a maximum of 42 years of
protection, because that is the term that the Copyright Act provided for
at the time. That is exactly what they got: copyright in all works in
which protection was acquired on July 1, 1867 did indeed expire by June
30, 1909 – 42 years later. From July 2, 1867 to the present day, however,
retroactive term extension has made every work that has acquired
federal copyright protection eligible for a longer term than the term in
force when it acquired that protection.
Correlatively, although it is frequently mentioned that the
maximum term of copyright under the Copyright Act of 1909 was 56
years, not a single work that gained federal copyright protection while
the 1909 Act was in force, from July 1, 1909 through December 31, 1977,
ended up receiving a copyright term of 56 years. All such works ended
up being eligible to receive either 75 or 95 years of protection. The
works that ended up receiving 56 years of protection gained federal
copyright protection during an earlier period, between July 2, 1867 and
September 19, 1906.
Part I of this Article addresses the prospective and retrospective
maximum terms of copyright for works acquiring federal copyright
protection from 1790 to 1977. It presents one chart and one table
summarizing that protection, and then presents the statutory
However, those charts focus on the present and the future, and therefore do not give a
complete historical perspective. Tom Bell has created a chart that comes closest to
providing that historical perspective. See Tom W. Bell, Trend of U.S. Maximum
General Copyright Term, http://www.tomwbell.com/writings/(C)_Term.html (last
visited May 3, 2015). That chart, however, is not accompanied by exact dates, nor by
an explanation of which events start the copyright term clock running, or which
pieces of legislation combined to create all of the terms and the periods during which
those terms were valid.
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interpretation underlying that chart and table while adding some
details that cannot be accommodated in simple graphic form. Part II
summarizes prospective and retrospective maximum copyright terms
from 1978 to the present. Part III provides a few remarks on the
difference between maximum and actual copyright term. Part IV
concludes by looking to the future, and explaining why the next time
we will know whether prospective and retrospective terms once again
coincide – assuming there is no further retroactive legislation in the
meantime – is midnight on December 31, 2068.
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56
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Figure 1: Maximum Term of Copyright,
Prospectively Announced and Actual,
For Works Acquiring Federal Copyright 1790-1977
from Robert Brauneis, A Brief Illustrated Chronicle of Retroactive Copyright Term Extension
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Table 1: Periods During Which Various Terms of Copyright Were Available,
For Works Acquiring Federal Copyright 1790-1977
from Robert Brauneis, A Brief Illustrated Chronicle of Retroactive Copyright Term Extension

Period during which
term was
prospectively
announced
(dates during which
legislation
designating term was
in force)
May 31, 1790 –
February 2, 1831
February 3, 1831 –
June 30, 1909

Period during which
term was actually
(retrospectively)
applied
Maximum Term
(dates of registration
(in years)
or first publication of
works receiving term
given retroactive
effect of legislation)
May 31, 1790 –
28
February 3, 1803
February 4, 1803 –
42
July 1, 1867

July 1, 1909 –
September 18, 1962
September 19, 1962 –
October 26, 1998
(after 10 incremental
increases in term)

July 2, 1867 –
September 19, 1906
September 20, 1906 –
December 31, 1922

56

October 27, 1998 present

January 1, 1923 –
December 31, 1977

95

75

Some Details

Initial Term
(in years)
14 from date of registration

Renewal Term
(in years)

14 if author still alive at end of first term;
fully assignable, devisable, descendible
28 from date of registration 14; renewal right to surviving author, or if
author dead to surviving widow, child or
children; for registrations before February 3,
1831, surviving author may have no right of
renewal.
28 (from date of registration 28
as retrospectively applied)
28 (from date of registration 47 (plus until the end of the calendar year in
until July 1, 1909, then from which the renewal term ended) after 10
date of publication with
Acts beginning September 19, 1962 and
notice; for qualifying
ending October 19, 1976
unpublished works, from
date of deposit)
28 (from date of publication 67 (plus until the end of the calendar year in
with notice; for qualifying
which the renewal term ended) (automatic
unpublished works, from
renewal effective for works gaining
date of deposit or
protection on or after Jan 1, 1964)
registration)
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I. Prospective and Retrospective Copyright Term for Works
Acquiring Federal Copyright Protection from May 31, 1790 through
December 31, 1977
Figure 1 and Table 1 show the periods during which various
terms of federal copyright protection were available for works that
acquired federal copyright protection from May 31, 1790 through
December 31, 1977.4 Figure 1 provides a rough overview of copyright
terms that does not include exact dates, but only years. The dotted line
shows the increases in term as they were prospectively announced,
while the dashed line shows terms as they were retroactively applied.
When the two lines converge, works ended up being eligible to receive
the maximum term of copyright that was announced as being in force
at the time copyright was acquired. When they diverge, works ended
up being eligible to receive a longer term of copyright than that
announced at the time of acquisition of copyright. The two periods
during which expected copyright term equaled actual copyright term
were 1790 to 1803 and 1831 to 1867. Thus, for two periods totaling about
48 years and ending in 1867, expected and actual copyright term
coincided. For the two remaining periods that together span about 138
years – 1803-1831 and 1867-1977 – actual copyright term ended up being
longer than expected term. The shaded triangular areas acknowledge
that Congress began to retroactively extend copyright term for works
still under copyright in 1962, and incrementally extended that term
nine times before reaching the 75-year maximum announced in the
Copyright Act of 1976. I will provide details about those incremental
extensions below.
Table 1 starts to provide more detail. It fills in the exact dates
during which particular maximum copyright terms were prospectively
and retrospectively available. A general comment about these exact
dates is in order. Before the first incremental extension of copyright
4

As most readers will know, until January 1, 1978, unpublished works were protected
under common law copyright, which at least now is thought to be exclusively a
matter of state and not federal law. While some unpublished works could also be
protected under federal law through registration, works first published after the
effective date of the Copyright Act of 1790 – May 31, 1790 – could be protected only
under federal law. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). Works that
acquired federal copyright protection on or after January 1, 1978 will be treated
separately below. The term of protection for a work in that latter category, when
authored by an identified natural person, is measured by the life of the author plus a
number of years, rather than a fixed number of years after acquisition of copyright,
rendering unified graphic display of pre-1978 and post-1978 terms difficult.
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term in 1962, the term of copyright was calculated to the exact day.
Thus, for example, the reporter’s note in the 1862 case of Cowen v. Banks
explains that copyright in one of the works at issue in that case – a
volume of cases decided in New York state courts, as reported by Judge
Esek Cowen – was alleged to have expired on November 13, 1843.5
Copyright registration records of the Southern District of New York
include a record dated November 13, 1829 – exactly fourteen years
earlier to the day – for volume IX of Cowen’s reports.6 That practice
continued under the Copyright Act of 1909 even though the general
measuring date changed from the date of registration to the date of first
publication – a date that was not necessarily contemporaneously
recorded, and hence was in some cases difficult or impossible to
ascertain. Hence, the 1973 Compendium of Copyright Office Practices
stated: “Copyright begins on the date of first publication, as shown by
the original application and other office records, and lasts for twentyeight years from that exact date.”7
When the Copyright Office began to consider revision of
copyright law in the late 1950s and early 1960s, it recognized that
determining exact dates of events other than registration was difficult,
and therefore recommended having copyright expire at the end of the
calendar year. Thus, the 1961 Report of the Register of Copyrights
states:
The copyright term now expires 28 or 56 years from the
precise day of first publication or earlier registration.
We propose that in all cases the term should run until the
end of the calendar year in which it would otherwise expire.
This provision, found in most foreign laws, would simplify the
computation of the term. It would then be enough to determine

5

See Cowen v. Banks, 6 F. Cas. 669, 669 (C.C.N.Y. 1862).
See Copyright Record Books of the District Courts 1790-1870 (hereinafter “District
Court Copyright Record Books”), vol. 137 (Southern District New York December
1828 – February 1831) (Microfilm Reel 30), no. 175; image available at
http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/rbrauneis/retroactive/CowenReg.pdf. The Library of
Congress catalog record for the Copyright Record Books series is available at
http://lccn.loc.gov/84114199; I have posted the 37-page catalog of those records at
http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/rbrauneis/retroactive/Catalog_of_District_Court_Co
pyright_Record_Books_1790_1870.pdf
7
See Compendium of Copyright Office Practices (hereinafter “Compendium One”) §
11.1.1
(July
1,
1973)
(emphasis
added),
available
at
http://copyright.gov/history/comp/compendium-one.pdf (last visited May 22, 2015).
6
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the year, rather than the exact date, of the event from which the
term is computed.8
The first incremental extension of copyright, passed on
September 19, 1962 and applicable to all works still under copyright on
that day, incorporated that proposal, and extended copyright in those
works to December 31, 1965.9 Subsequent incremental extensions also
incorporated year-end expiration of copyright, as did the Copyright Act
of 1976.10 Thus, September 19, 1962 is the date of transition from exactday to year-end expiration of copyright.
Table 1 assumes that a year of copyright protection would not
include both the date that the protection began and that same date one
year later, but would rather terminate at the end of the day before the
date of the first anniversary of the beginning of protection. In other
words, copyright hypothetically acquired for a term of one year on
January 1st of a given year would run through December 31st of that
year, and would end at midnight – the moment that December 31st
ended and January 1st of the next year began. If the term of copyright
ran through January 1st of the next year, the grant would actually be for
a year and a day.11
8

Copyright Law Revision: Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General
Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law, House Committee Print, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., at 56
(July 1961); cf. James J. Guinan, Jr., Duration of Copyright, Study No. 30, at 74 (January
1957), in Copyright Law Revision: Studies Prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate,
Eighty-Sixth Congress, Second Session Pursuant to S. Res. 240, Studies 29-31
(Committee Print 1961) (“In those countries which have adopted [a term based on the
life of the author], the term is generally measured from the last day of the calendar
year in which the author died, or the first day of the succeeding year, thus making it
necessary to know only the year in which he died rather than the exact date. It might
be worth considering this latter provision in connection with this or any of the other
possible starting points for the term.”).
9
Pub. L. 87-668, 76. Stat. 555 (September 19, 1962).
10
See infra n. 57 (listing the incremental extensions); 17 U.S.C. §§ 304(a), 304(b), 305
(1976) (providing for year-end expiration of copyright both retroactively and
prospectively); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1574, at 142 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659 (explaining the rationale of year-end termination) (“This will make the duration
of copyright much easier to compute, since it will be enough to determine the year,
rather than the exact date, of the event from which the term is based.”).
11
In determining the period during which it was possible to file a renewal registration,
the Copyright Office followed a more generous rule. According to the first
Compendium of Copyright Office Practices, “The renewal year . . . comprises both the
twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth anniversaries of the date on which copyright
began,” Compendium One, supra n. 7, at § 11.2.2, which of course adds up to a year and
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The “Some Details” column of Table 1 also notes that the
maximum term has until recently not been a unified term, but has been
composed of an initial or original term and a renewal term. The latter
has been subject to various conditions and available to various parties
over time. To explain and substantiate each of the entries in Table 1,
and to add some additional details, I will address in turn each of the
pieces of legislation that creates one or more entries in the table.
A. The Copyright Act of 1790. The Copyright Act of 1790 was
signed into law on May 31, 1790.12 To gain copyright protection under
that Act, the author of a “map, chart, [or] book” or his assignee had to
“deposit a printed copy of the title [thereof] in the clerk’s office . . . of
the district court where the author or proprietor shall reside.”13 The
clerk then recorded that title, noting the date of recording, and an

a day. In addition, “[i]f the original copyright expires on a Saturday, Sunday, or
holiday within the District of Columbia, renewal action may be taken on the next
succeeding business day.” Id. § 12.2.2.IV. Presumably, neither of those sections
extended the original term of copyright even if no renewal was made; rather, they
rendered retroactively effective a renewal that was made a day or two after the end of
the original term.
12
See An Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts,
and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein
mentioned (May 31, 1790), in Public Statutes at Large of the United States of America,
from the organization of the Government in 1789, to March 3, 1845, p. 124 (Richard
Peters, ed., 1845) (hereinafter “Copyright Act of 1790”).
13
Id. § 3. To maintain copyright protection, the owner of copyright also had to make
sure that a copy of the record made by the clerk was published in one or more
newspapers within two months, see id., and to deliver a copy of the map, chart, or book
to the Secretary of State within six months, see id. § 4. An amendment in 1802 added
the further requirement of placing copyright notice in a required form in each copy of
any book for which federal copyright protection was secured. See An Act
supplementary to an act, intituled, “An act for the encouragement of learning, by
securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such
copies, during the times therein mentioned,” and extending the benefits thereof to the
arts of designing, engraving and etching historical and other prints (April 29, 1802), in
Public Statutes at Large of the United States of America, from the organization of the
Government in 1789, to March 3, 1845, p. 171 (Richard Peters, ed., 1845). However, it
was the deposit and recording of the title of the map, chart or book that triggered the
term of copyright protection. See, e.g., James J. Guinan, Jr., Duration of Copyright, supra
n. 8, at 58 (“[R]ecording of the title of the work in the office of the clerk of the District
Court prior to publication was required to secure copyright, and the term was
measured from the date of recording the title, rather than from the date of publication
as in the Statute of Anne and earlier State legislation.”).
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initial term of fourteen years of protection began on that date.14 As
noted above, the term was exactly fourteen years from the date of
recordation – fourteen years to the day.
One example of how copyright term was calculated under the
1790 Act involves the very first book to gain federal copyright
protection in the United States. On June 9, 1790, the Clerk of the
District Court of Pennsylvania recorded John Barry’s deposit of the title
of his book “The Philadelphia Spelling Book.”15 The last day of the first
term of copyright for that book was therefore June 8, 1804, exactly 14
years later. The Copyright Act of 1790 also provided for a renewal term
of an additional fourteen years, on two conditions. First, at the end of
the first term the author had to still be alive and be a citizen or resident
of the United States. Second, within the last six months of the first
term the title of the work had to again be deposited with the clerk of
court.16 The Act granted the renewal term to the author “or his . . .
executors, administrators or assigns,” thus making the renewal right
fully assignable, devisable, and descendible.17 On January 23, 1804, the
14

Id. § 1. As Copyright Office regulations later made explicit, “The title is recorded on the
day of its receipt in the Copyright Office, in accordance with the provisions of the copyright
statutes, and no date prior to the day of receipt can be given to the entry of title.”
Directions for Registering Copyrights p. 14 (May 1900), in A Compilation of the
Regulations Concerning Copyright 1874-1956, p. 107 (emphasis in original). Although
the Copyright Act of 1790 speaks of “depositing” the title of a book, and of the clerk
“recording” that title, those are both steps in what we would now call “registration”;
modern copyright terminology reserves “deposit” for the process of submitting a copy
or copies of a work, and “recording” for the process of placing on public record
documents pertaining to copyright. However, the modern registration process
involves examination of the deposit copy to determine whether it contains
copyrightable subject matter; “registration” in the early 19th century had no
examination component.
15
See Federal Copyright Records, 1790-1800 (James Gilreath, ed., Elizabeth Carter
Wills, comp.), p. 1 (1987) (presenting an entry from the Pennsylvania District Court
Ledger, 262 PA 1, which notes that on June 9, 1790, the title of “The Philadelphia
Spelling Book” was deposited, listing John Barry as both the claimant and author).
16
See Copyright Act of 1790 § 1.
17
See id. Of course, the “executors” of the author could not file a renewal registration,
since an author would only have executors if he had died, and the 1790 Act granted a
renewal term only if the author lived through the end of the initial term. However, if
the author successfully renewed but died during the renewal term, his ownership
interest in the renewal term would pass through his executors to his devisees or heirs.
As for assignees, if the author had explicitly assigned rights in the renewal term in
advance and survived the initial term, presumably the assignee of those rights could
file a renewal registration, as Henry Sweitzer did for “The Philadelphia Spelling
Book.”
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Clerk of the District Court of Pennsylvania recorded Henry Sweitzer’s
deposit of the title of John Barry’s book “The Philadelphia Spelling
Book,” with Sweitzer’s claim to be proprietor of copyright in that
book.18 Assuming that Sweitzer was the assignee of John Barry, and
that Barry was still alive on June 9, 1804, the book then enjoyed
protection through June 8, 1818, and entered the public domain on June
9, 1818.19
Because the Copyright Act of 1790 was the first federal
copyright act, it could not retroactively increase the term of copyright
for any works that were previously under federal copyright protection,
because there were no such works. As for works not yet published at
the time the 1790 Act was passed, the Act required that their titles be
deposited with the relevant clerks of court before publication in order
to gain protection.20 However, the Act did allow works already
published at the time the Act was passed to gain the two fourteen-year
terms of federal copyright protection described above.21 One prominent
18

See District Court Copyright Record Books, supra n. 6, vol. 262 (Pennsylvania June 9,
1790 – December 24, 1804) (Microfilm Reel 61), no. 27. The record of Henry Sweitzer’s
deposit does not note that it is a second-term or renewal deposit, and thus provides
the public with incomplete information. Looking at that record alone, one would not
know that the copyright in the work could not be further renewed, nor would one
know the date that the second term ended (which would be, not exactly fourteen
years from the date of recording the second-term title deposit, but exactly fourteen
years after the date that the first term ended).
I should also note that most early record books do not record the year
according to the Gregorian calendar, but according to the “Year of Independence.”
The first Year of Independence began on July 4, 1776 and ended on July 3, 1777, and
every succeeding Year of Independence runs from July 4 through July 3. Thus, the
record of Henry Sweitzer’s deposit is recorded as having been made on the “twenty
third day of January in the twenty eighth year of the Independence of the United
States of America.” In Gregorian terms, the 28th Year of Independence began on July 4,
1803 and ended on July 3, 1804. Any date from July 4 through December 31 in that Year
of Independence would fall in 1803; any date from January 1 through July 3 in that Year
of Independence would fall in 1804.
19
There is an ongoing controversy whether the author of the Philadelphia Spelling
Book was the same John Barry as the Revolutionary War naval officer who is often
referred to as the “Father of the American Navy.” See William Kelly, “John Barry and
John Barry,” http://remembertheintrepid.blogspot.com/2008/04/john-barry-and-johnbarry.html (last visited May 9, 2015). The latter died on September 13, 1803. See John
Barry (naval officer), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Barry_(naval_officer). If there
was only one John Barry, then his death before the end of the first term of copyright
would have precluded a second term.
20
See id.
21
See Copyright Act of 1790 § 1.
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example of a work that gained such protection was Noah Webster’s A
Grammatical Institute of the English Language. In the 1780s, Webster had
obtained copyright protection for his Grammatical Institute in several
states.22 On October 7, 1790, Webster’s publishers, Isaiah Thomas and
Ebenezer T. Andrews, obtained federal copyright protection for that
book.23 As William Maher has shown, however, acquisition of federal
copyright in the early years of the 1790 Act was rare, and acquisition of
copyright for books already published even rarer. Of the approximately
21,000 printed editions of books, charts and maps in the United States
between 1790 and 1800, there are copyright registration records for only
684; of those 684 registrations, only 12 registrations were for previously
published works.24 Thus, the registrations for previously published
works amount to less than 2% of copyright registrations, and less than
0.06%, or about one in 2000, of printed editions.25
B. The Copyright Act of 1831. On February 3, 1831, Congress
passed a comprehensive revision of federal copyright law.26 That Act
retained many features of federal copyright duration under the 1790
Act, including the divided structure of an initial term and a renewal
term, the provision that the initial term would begin on the date that
the title of the work was recorded, and the renewal term’s length of 14
years.27 At the same time, the 1831 Act increased the initial term of
copyright to 28 years, and it dropped the requirement that the author
survive until the beginning of the renewal term to obtain such a term.
Section 2 of the Act, applicable to works first gaining federal copyright
protection on or after its effective date, specified that the new renewal
term vested in the author, or if the author had died, in the author’s
widow, child, or children.28

22

See Federal Copyright Records, 1790-1800, supra n. 15, at xx-xxi; William J. Maher,
Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension, and the Copyright Law of 1790 in
Historical Context, 49 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 1021, 1033-34 (2002).
23
See Federal Copyright Records, 1790-1800, supra n. 15, at 74 (presenting an entry
from the Massachusetts District Court Ledger, 42 MA 2, which notes that on October
7, fifteenth year of Independence, Isaiah Thomas & Eben. T. Andrews deposited the
title of a book written by Noah Webster Junior Esquire.
24
See Maher, supra n. 22, at 1023-25.
25
See id.
26
See An Act to amend the several acts respecting copyrights (Feb. 3, 1831), 21st Cong.,
2d Sess., ch. 16, 4 Stat. 439 (hereinafter “Copyright Act of 1831”).
27
See id. §§ 1, 2.
28
See id. §1.

12

Although Section 16 of the 1831 Act raises at least two
interpretive issues, to which I will return in a moment, it was clearly
intended to extend the benefit of most of the Act’s provisions, including
the increased initial term, to some works that had already gained
federal copyright protection. The retroactivity of that term extension
was hardly an afterthought. The most vocal advocate for the extension
was lexicographer Noah Webster, brother of Senator Daniel Webster
and father-in-law of Representative William Ellsworth, the latter of
whom were principal proponents of the 1831 Act in their respective
Houses of Congress.29 Webster wanted extended copyright protection
for his books, including books for which he had already received federal
copyright protection.
The registration history for Webster’s “An American Dictionary
of the English Language,” perhaps his most famous and enduring work,
provides a good example of the uncontroversial working of retroactive
extension under the 1831 Act. Webster had obtained federal copyright
protection for that book by depositing its title on April 14, 1828.30
Under the 1790 Act as in effect at that time, Webster would have
expected a 14-year initial term of copyright that would end on April 13,
1842. If he survived until that date (which he did, barely – he was 83,
and died the following year at age 84),31 he or his assigns could have
obtained a second 14-year term that would end on April 13, 1856. After
the passage of the 1831 Act, the initial term for “An American
Dictionary” was retroactively lengthened to 28 years, so that it ended
on April 13, 1856. Webster was no longer alive on that date, but five of
his children were, including Emily Ellsworth, wife of the 1831 Act’s
proponent Representative William Ellsworth. On January 9, 1856,
those five children again deposited the title of “An American Dictionary
of the English Language . . . in renewal of a copy-right for fourteen
years, from the Expiration of the first copyright of the same book
heretofore issued from this office, on the fourteenth day of April 1828 . . .
29

See Micklethwait, supra note 43, at 211-221 (2000) (detailing Webster’s campaign to
lengthen the term of copyright). Noah Webster had also been active in lobbying for
passage of copyright acts by the states in the 1780s, and for passage of the first federal
copyright act in 1790, although Micklethwait argues that Webster was far less
responsible for the passage of those acts than he claimed to be. See id. at 74-80.
30
See District Court Copyright Record Books, supra n. 6, vol. 6 (Connecticut March
1825 – December 1841) (Microfilm Reel 1), p. 91, no. 552, image available at
http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/rbrauneis/retroactive/Websterrenewal.pdf.
31
See II Connecticut Biographical Dictionary 564 (Caryn Hanna, ed. 2008) (Webster
was born on October 16, 1758); id. at 565 (Webster died on May 28, 1843).
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.”32 The retroactively extended term of copyright thus ended up
expiring on April 13, 1870.
That brings us to the two interpretive issues raised by Section
16 of the 1831 Act. The first of those is, did the 1831 Act bestow an
increased initial term of 28 years on works that were either in their
initial terms or in their renewal terms on the date of passage of the Act,
or only on works that were in their initial terms on that date? If the
former, then the term extension would cover any work in which federal
copyright protection was obtained on or after February 4, 1803; if the
latter, the term extension would cover only those works in which
federal copyright protection was obtained on or after February 4, 1817.
Section 16 states that the extended term will apply “whenever a
copyright has been heretofore obtained . . . Provided, That this act shall
not extend to any copyright heretofore secured, the term of which has
already expired.”33 On its face, that language would not seem to
distinguish between initial and renewal terms, and I will argue that
that is the better reading the Act. Professor Tom Bell’s copyright term
chart, however, appears to conclude that Section 16 makes the Act
retroactively apply only to copyrights in their initial term on the Act’s
date of passage, and thus only to copyrights obtained on or after
February 4, 1817.34 There would be a great deal of sense in that
interpretation if the renewal term under the 1790 Act was not
completely alienable. Under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
1909 Act, for example, an author cannot make any advance assignment
of the renewal term that would be enforced if that author dies before
the end of the initial term.35 If the author does not survive until the end
of the initial term, the 1909 Act preemptively intervenes to vest renewal
rights in a defined class of beneficiaries. Retroactively extending the
initial term of copyright in a case in which the renewal term was owned
by a different party than the initial term would result in an immediate
change in ownership, and it seems unlikely that Congress would have
intended such a consequence.

32

See District Court Copyright Record Books, supra note 6, vol. 7 (Connecticut
January 1842 – June 1859) (Microfilm Reel 1), p. 265, no. 1695, image available at
http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/rbrauneis/retroactive/AmericanDictionary1856renew
al.pdf.
33
Copyright Act of 1831, supra n. 26, § 16.
34
See Bell, supra n. 3.
35
See Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1963).
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However, the entire structure of the 1831 Act’s provisions
respecting term is probably best viewed as reconciling the retroactive
extension of that term, and the narrowing of the class of beneficiaries of
the new renewal term, with the preservation of pre-existing
expectations. The 28-year initial term of the 1831 Act essentially
consolidated the previous Act’s two 14-year terms, and then added a
third 14-year term for the benefit of widows and children. Section 16 of
the Act provided that the retroactively extended 28-year term would
vest in the author, or if he had died before the date of the Act’s passage,
in the author’s “executors, administrators, or assigns.”36 That provision
thus preserved whatever deals the author might have made before 1831
for either of the then-existing two 14-year terms of copyright. For
example, any publisher to whom the author had assigned both of those
14-year terms would under the retroactive provisions of the 1831 Act
own copyright for the duration of the 28-year initial term. Since
twenty-eight is exactly two times fourteen, the publisher could not
complain that the 1831 Act had disturbed any expectations. The only
parties who could complain about expectations upset by the addition
of another 14 years of copyright were members of the public. Although
at least one Member of Congress did voice such complaints,37 they did
not result in any legal challenge to the retroactive extension.
The number of renewal registrations under the 1831 Act for
works that originally gained copyright before 1817 is undoubtedly very
small. I have only been able to find one, though admittedly I have not
done an exhaustive search; given the state of pre-1870 copyright
records, an exhaustive search would take months or years. The one
that I have found again concerns Noah Webster. Webster’s second
most famous work is probably “The American Spelling Book.” Webster
obtained federal copyright protection for that book (a revised version of
the first part of the Grammatical Institutes, mentioned above38) by
depositing its title in U.S. District Court for Connecticut on March 14,
1804.39 Before the initial term of copyright in that book expired,
36

Id.
See VII Gales & Seaton’s Register of Debates in Congress 423 (Jan. 6, 1831) (remarks
of Mr. Hoffman) (“Mr. Hoffman opposed the bill, which appeared to be at variance
with every principle of sound public policy. It went to establish a monopoly of which
authors alone would reap the advantage, to the public detriment.”)
38
See supra p. 10.
39
The copyright registration records for March 1804 in Connecticut have not
survived, but this is the date of registration found in the copyright notice on the
American Spelling Book. See Noah Webster, The American Spelling Book (Thirtieth
37
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Webster deposited the title of that book a second time, on September
15, 1817.40 Under the 1790 Act, the second term would have expired on
March 13, 1832. In the meantime, however, the Copyright Act of 1831
had been passed. Looking to take advantage of that Act’s retroactive
extension of the first term and new renewal term, Webster deposited
the title of The American Spelling Book a third time, on September 26,
1831,41 intending to gain another 14 years of protection.
Whether he in fact gained another 14 years of protection leads
us to the second interpretive question raised by Section 16 of the 1831
Act. Section 2 of the 1831 Act, applicable to federal copyrights obtained
on or after the date of the Act’s passage, grants renewal rights to “the
author . . . or, if [he is] dead, to [his] widow and child, or children.” By
contrast, Section 16 of the Act, applicable to federal copyrights secured
before the Act’s date of passage, grants “the same right, to [the author’s]
widow, child or children to renew the copyright, at the expiration
thereof, as is above provided in relation to copyrights originally secured
under this Act.” Thus, the Section 16 formulation does not explicitly
grant the renewal right to the author, but only to his widow and
children. Noah Webster apparently became convinced that because of
that formulation, and because he was still alive at the end of the
extended initial term of copyright in the American Spelling Book, his
attempt to renew was ineffective, and the book entered the public
domain. On a copy of a copyright bill that predated the 1831 Act,
Webster wrote:
Revised Impression 1809), image of copyright notice page available at
http://digital.library.pitt.edu/cgi-bin/t/text/pagevieweridx?c=nietz;cc=nietz;idno=00acf7166m;rgn=full%20text;didno=00acf7166m;view=image;
seq=8;node=00acf7166m%3A1;page=root;size=s;frm=frameset;.
40
See District Court Copyright Record Books, supra note 6, vol. 46 (Massachusetts
April 1814 – 1825) (Microfilm Reel 8), no. 169.
41
See District Court Copyright Record Books, supra note 6, vol. 6 (Connecticut March
1825 – December 1841) (Microfilm Reel 1) p. 235, no. 725. I originally thought that the
1831 Act’s retroactive term extension might apply only to those works that were in
their initial term of copyright on February 3, 1831, and not to those that were in their
second or renewal term. Webster’s third recording of a title originally recording in
1804, however, is good evidence that the 1831 Act should be read exactly as written –
to apply to any work still under copyright, regardless of the term. Part of my reason
for thinking that the extension would not apply to works in their renewal term was
that the renewal term might be owned by a different party than the initial term was,
and retroactive extension of the initial term might therefore transfer ownership.
However, under the 1790 Act, there were no restrictions on advance assignment or
devise of the renewal term, and the 1831 Act preserved whatever assignments might
have been made, so it would not have resulted in any transfers of ownership.
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The last section does not give the privilege of renewal to
the widows & children of deceased authors. This defect was
supplied by Mr. Ellsworth, at my request, which had special
reference to the case of the widow & heirs of Dr. Dwight. But in
redrafting the 16th section Mr. Ellsworth omitted the words to
him before the words the widow by which I lost the right of
renewal of the American Spelling Book. N. Webster.42
I don’t know how Webster came to this conclusion – I have not
found any record of any litigation involving the renewal period of The
American Spelling Book – but he apparently did, and it is consistent
with the language of Section 16 of the Act. Thus, it is likely that, due to
what was probably a drafting oversight,43 Section 16 granted rights in
the new renewal term only to the author’s “widow, child or children,”
so that authors of works that gained federal copyright protection before
March 3, 1831 who survived to the end of the initial 28-year term could
not obtain another 14-year term, and their works fell into the public
domain at the end of that initial term.
C. The Copyright Act of 1909. Although the Copyright Act of
1870 introduced many important changes to copyright law, including
centralization of copyright registration in the Library of Congress,44 it
retained the copyright term provisions of the 1831 Act.45 The next
changes made to copyright term were in the Copyright Act of 1909,
which became law on March 4, 1909 and provided for an effective date

42
Noah Webster Papers, New York Public Library, Box 8, folder of papers related to
N.W.’s struggle for copyright laws, copy of Amendment to H.R. 140, February 21,
1828,
image
available
at
http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/rbrauneis/retroactive/HR140Amendment.pdf. (see
page 8 bottom). Many thanks to David Micklethwait for referring me to this
handwritten note. The “Dr. Dwight” to whom Noah Webster refers is undoubtedly
Timothy Dwight IV (1752-1817), a Congregationalist minister, the eighth President of
Yale College, and a prolific author. Two of his most popular works were published
posthumously: “Theology explained and defended in a Series of Sermons,” published
in 1818, and “Travels in New-England and New-York,” published in 1821-1822. See
Wikipedia, “Timothy Dwight IV,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timothy_Dwight_IV
(last visited June 13, 2015).
43
See David Micklethwait, Noah Webster and the American Dictionary 219 (2000)
(explaining how Section 16 was hastily substituted for a previous version that would
have required the author to live to the end of the first term, and opining that such
haste probably resulted in a drafting mistake).
44
See Act of July 8, 1870, §§ 85, 90, 16 Stat. 198.
45
See id. §§ 87, 88.
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of July 1, 1909.46 The 1909 Act retained a divided-term structure of an
initial term and a renewal term.47 It also retained an initial term of 28
years;48 but it changed the basis on which federal copyright was
acquired, and therefore changed the event that would start the 28-year
term running. Under the 1909 Act, the initial term of federal copyright
was generally acquired, not by the recording of the title of a work, but
simply by publication of the work with proper copyright notice.49
Thus, the initial term ran for 28 years from the date of publication with
notice.50 The Act, however, did allow some works to gain federal
copyright protection without publication, “by the deposit, with claim
of copyright, of one complete copy of such work . . . .”51 If a copy of an
eligible work was properly deposited, then the initial 28-year term of
copyright began running on the date of that deposit.52 The 1909 Act’s
term extension focused on the renewal term: that term was increased
from 14 to 28 years.53
Section 24 of 1909 Act provided that its increased 28-year
renewal term would apply to all works in which copyright still
subsisted as of its effective date of July 1, 1909.54 Any work in which
federal copyright had been secured on July 2, 1867 or later, and in which
copyright had been validly renewed, would still be under copyright on
July 1, 1909, 42 years later. Conversely, the term of a work in which
46

See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 64, 35 Stat. 1080 (hereinafter “Copyright Act of
1909”) (providing for an effective date of July 1, 1909).
47
See id. § 23. For one account of the background of the 1909 Act, see Ochoa, supra n. 2,
at 33-39.
48
See id.
49
See id. § 9.
50
See id. § 23.
51
See id. § 11.
52
The 1909 Act was actually silent on this issue, but the Ninth Circuit filled the gap in
Marx v. United States, 96 F. 2d 204, 206-07 (9th Cir. 1938). See also Shilkret v. Musicraft
Records, Inc., 131 F.2d 929, 932 (2d Cir. 1942) (citing Marx approvingly). The
Copyright Office once used the date of deposit as the measuring date to begin the
period of federal copyright protection for unpublished works, but then switched in
1949 to using the date of registration, meaning the date that deposit, application and
fee have all been received by the Office. See Compendium of Copyright Office Practices
(“Compendium I”) § 11.1.2.I (1973). This change may have been made to encourage
timely submission of application and fee.
53
See Copyright Act of 1909, § 23.
54
See id. § 24 ("[T]he copyright subsisting in any work at the time when this Act goes
into effect may, at the expiration of the term provided for under existing law, be
renewed and extended . . . for a further period such that the entire term shall be equal
to that secured by this Act, including the renewal period . . . .").
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federal copyright was first secured on July 1, 1867 or earlier would
expire at or before the end of June 30, 1909, and therefore would not be
subsisting on July 1, 1909, and would not be eligible for the increased
renewal term.
D. From the joint resolution of September 19, 1962, through
the Copyright Act of 1976. On September 19, 1962, Congress passed a
joint resolution “[e]xtending the duration of copyright protection in
certain cases.”55 That resolution provided that in any case in which the
renewal term of copyright subsisting on September 19, 1962 would
expire prior to December 31, 1965, that renewal term would continue
until December 31, 1965.56 The purpose of that stand-alone extension of
term was to keep those works under copyright until Congress could
pass a general revision of copyright, which was anticipated to
retroactively increase copyright term for all works still under copyright.
As the general revision became subject to repeated delay, Congress
repeatedly passed additional incremental extensions of term. Over the
next 12 years, Congress ended up passing eight additional extensions,
thus keeping under copyright through 1976 all works that were still in
their renewal term on September 19, 1962.57 Finally, in the Copyright
Act of 1976, passed on October 19, 1976, Congress provided for a
55

Pub. L. 87-668, 76. Stat. 555 (September 19, 1962). For more detail on interim
extension legislation, see Ochoa, supra n. 2, at 40-42.
56
See id. The full text of the resolution provided: “Resolved by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That in any case in
which the renewal term of copyright subsisting in any work on the date of approval of
this resolution would expire prior to December 31, 1965, such term is hereby
continued until December 31, 1965.” Id.
57
See Joint Resolution of August 28, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-142, 79 Stat. 581 (1965)
(extending any renewal term of copyright subsisting on August 28, 1965 to December
31, 1967); Joint Resolution of November 16, 1967, Pub. L. No 90-141, 81 Stat. 464 (1967)
(extending any renewal term of any copyright subsisting on November 16, 1967 to
December 31, 1968); Joint Resolution of July 23, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-416, 82 Stat. 397
(1968) (extending the renewal term of any copyright subsisting on July 23, 1968 to
December 31, 1969); Joint Resolution of December 16, 1969, Pub. L. no. 91-147, 83 Stat.
360 (1969) (extending the renewal term of any copyright subsisting on Dec. 16, 1969 to
December 31, 1970); Joint Resolution of December 17, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-555, 84 Stat.
1441 (1970) (extending the renewal term of any copyright subsisting on Dec. 17, 1970
to December 31, 1971); Joint Resolution of November 24, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-170, 85
Stat. 490 (1971) (extending the renewal term of any copyright subsisting on Nov. 24,
1971 to December 31, 1972); Joint Resolution of October 25, 1972, Pub. L. No. 95-566,
86 Stat. 1181 (1972) (extending the renewal term of any copyright subsisting on Oct.
25, 1972 to December 31, 1974); Act of December 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 104, 88
Stat. 1873 (1974) (extending the renewal term of any copyright subsisting on Dec. 31,
1974 to December 31, 1976).
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renewal term of 47 years,58 and a total combined term of 75 years for any
work still in its renewal term as of December 31, 1977.59 As noted above,
the 1976 Act also provided that all terms of copyright would extend to
the end of the calendar year during which they would otherwise
expire.60
The cumulative effect of the incremental extensions of copyright
term and of the Copyright Act of 1976 is thus as follows. Any work in
which federal copyright had been secured on September 20, 1906 or
later, and in which copyright had been validly renewed, was still under
copyright on September 19, 1962, 56 years later, and thus ultimately
received a total term of 75 years, ending not on the precise date 75 years
after the date that copyright was acquired, but at the end of the
calendar year in which that date occurred.61 Conversely, the term of a
work in which federal copyright was first secured on or before
September 19, 1906 would expire at or before the end of the day on
September 18, 1962, and therefore would not be subsisting on
September 19, 1962, and would not be eligible for the 75-year total term.
E. The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act. Finally,
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (“CTEA”) was passed
on October 27, 1998,62 and became effective immediately.63 Section
102(d) of that Act provides that the renewal term of copyrights still
subsisting on the effective date of the Act would be increased to 67
years, and that any work in which copyright was in its renewal term as
of the effective date of the Act would have a term of copyright of 95
years from the date on which copyright was first secured.64 Since the
1976 Act provided for end-of-calendar-year expiration of term, any
work in which federal copyright had been secured on January 1, 1923 or
later, and in which copyright had been validly renewed, would still be
under copyright on October 27, 1998. Conversely, the term of copyright
of a work in which federal copyright was first secured on or before
December 31, 1922 expired no later than the end of the day on December
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See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1976).
See 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1976).
60
See 17 U.S.C. § 305 (1976).
61
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 304(a), 304(b), 305 (1976).
62
See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (“CTEA”), Pub. L. No. 195-298, 112
Stat. 2827. For further background on this Act, see Ochoa, supra n. 2, at 40-42.
63
See id. § 106.
64
See id. § 102(d).
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31, 1997, and therefore was not subsisting on October 27, 1998, and was
not eligible for the increased term.
II. Prospective and Retrospective Copyright Term for Works
Acquiring Federal Copyright Protection On or After January 1, 1978.
The Copyright Act of 1976 prospectively changed both the
method of measuring the term of federal copyright protection, and the
events that result in acquiring that protection. The basic term of
protection for works created on or after January 1, 1978, or created but
not published or registered before January 1, 1978, was the life of the
work’s author plus 50 years.65 Works that were created as works made
for hire, or that were published anonymously or pseudonymously,
received a term equal to the lesser of 75 years after publication or 100
years after creation.66 Under the 1976 Act, works receive federal
protection upon fixation; neither publication with notice nor
registration is necessary, although the original 1976 Act did continue to
require copyright notice as a condition of maintaining copyright
protection after publication.
Because state common law had generally been thought to
provide perpetual protection for unpublished works67 and for sound
recordings, the Copyright Act of 1976 could be viewed as actually
effecting retroactive contractions of copyright term with respect to those
works – to date, the only retroactive contractions of term in the history
of U.S. copyright law.68 However, it would be a mistake to think that
the protection afforded under common law copyright was in every
respect as extensive and as well-defined as federal protection, so that
the 1976 Act’s preemption of common law copyright shortened term
while maintaining all other aspects of protection. Common law
protection, for example, does not offer remedies such as statutory
damages or attorney’s fees, and the contours of that protection are still
being judicially determined: the first opinion to decide that sound
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See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976).
See 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1976).
67
See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); Melville B. Nimmer & David
Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 9.09.
68
See generally R. Anthony Reese, Public but Private: Copyright’s New Unpublished
Public Domain, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 585 (2007).
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recordings enjoyed a public performance right at common law (as it
turns out, the common law of New York) was issued in 2014.69
Moreover, transition rules softened the effect of the retroactive
contractions of term. Regardless of the terms of copyright generally
available under the 1976 Act, that Act provided that no unpublished
work would enter the public domain until January 1, 2003, 25 years
after the effective date of the 1976 Act. Moreover, publication by
December 31, 2002 of any work created but not published or registered
before 1978 would result in copyright protection through at least
December 31, 2027, 50 years after the 1976 Act’s effective date.70 The
CTEA added another 20 years to that minimum term, resulting in
protection through at least December 31, 2047.71 As for sound
recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, which were protected under
state rather than federal law, the 1976 Act provided that they would not
be governed by federal law, including federal term limitations, until
February 15, 2047, 75 years after the last one of them was made.72 The
CTEA also pushed that date back 20 years, resulting in the preservation
of state-law protection until February 15, 2067.73
As for works created after December 31, 1977, virtually all of
them ended up getting the benefit of another retroactive extension of
term. The CTEA extended the basic term of copyright to life of the
author plus 70 years, and the term for works made for hire and
anonymous and pseudonymous works to the lesser of 95 years after
publication or 120 years after creation.74 Only a very few works created
after December 31, 1977 had fallen into the public domain before the
effective date of the CTEA, namely, those that were published without
proper copyright notice between January 1, 1978 and February 28, 1989,
and for which that deficiency was not cured under available 1976 Act
provisions.75 All of the rest received the benefit of the CTEA extension.
69

See Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 113 U.S.P.Q.2d 1285 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
See 17 U.S.C. § 303 (1976).
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CTEA, supra n. 62, § 102(c).
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See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c)
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CTEA, supra n. 62, § 102(a).
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Id. § 102(b).
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For the general requirement of copyright notice in the original Copyright Act of
1976, see 17 U.S.C. § 401 (1976). For the means of curing some notice deficiencies, see 17
U.S.C. § 405(a) (1976). The Berne Convention Implementation Act, which eliminated
the notice requirement, became effective on March 1, 1989. See Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7 (eliminating the notice
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III. Maximum Copyright Term and Actual Copyright Term
Although this article has focused principally on maximum
copyright term, for most of the history of U.S. copyright law a work
could end up receiving far less than the maximum term, and most
works did receive far less.
First, from the 1790 Act until the March 1, 1989 effective date of
the Berne Convention Implementation Act,76 publication of a work
without the observation of required formalities, which variously over
time included registration, copyright notice on copies and/or in
newspapers, and deposit, could result in immediate forfeiture of
copyright, and injection of the work into the public domain. Second,
works that were published before 1978 were all originally granted a
split copyright term that required renewal registration to maintain
protection after the first portion of that term. Most copyright owners
did not take the affirmative steps necessary to renew copyright.77
Moreover, for works for which federal copyright was obtained from
February 4, 1803 through July 1, 1881, renewal was only available to a
limited class of persons, which in some circumstances was an empty
class, thus foreclosing renewal altogether.78 It is therefore possible that
the single greatest retroactive extension of actual copyright term, as
opposed to maximum copyright term, was effected by the Copyright
Renewal Act of 1992. That Act retroactively lifted the requirement of
renewal for all works published between January 1, 1964 and December
requirement), § 13 (defining the Act’s effective date), 102 Stat. 2853, 2857-59, 2861
(Oct. 31, 1988).
76
See n. 75, supra.
77
For a discussion of historical renewal rates, see William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 238-249 (2003).
78
As noted above, the Copyright Act of 1831 created a new renewal term, which was
prospectively for the benefit of the author, if he survived through the end of the initial
term, or for his widow and child or children if he did not. The section of the Act that
retroactively extended the benefit of the that new renewal term neglected to include
the author, and therefore made renewal available only if the author died before the end
of the initial term but had a widow and/or a child or children who survived through
the end of that term. The Copyright Act of 1909 expanded the class of persons eligible
to renew to include executors and heirs, and Section 24 of that Act retroactively
applied that expansion to all works still under copyright when the Act became
effective. Since the Act became effective on July 1, 1909, that expansion would apply
to all works that were still in their initial 28-year term of copyright on that date,
which would include all works for which federal copyright was secured on or after
July 2, 1881.
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31, 1977. Since far fewer than half of those works would likely have
been renewed, the Act retroactively added 47 years of copyright, which
under the CTEA ended up becoming 67 years of copyright, to millions
of works published during those 13 years.79
Thus, just as the history of U.S. copyright law has for the most
part been a history of lengthening of maximum copyright term, it has
also been for the most part a history of lessening of copyright
formalities that could cause actual copyright term to be shorter than
maximum term. After the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, only an a
copyright owner’s affirmative dedication of a work to the public
domain could conceivably result in that work enjoying less than the
maximum term of copyright, and it is not completely clear that
copyright owners always have the power to make such a dedication.80
IV. Conclusion: Looking Back from the Future
Every time Congress has extended the term of copyright, it has
done so retroactively. The Eldred Court charitably suggested that the
retroactivity provisions were afterthoughts, motivated by concerns of
equal treatment: Congress “grant[ed] to authors of works with existing
copyrights the benefit of term extensions so that all under copyright
protection will be governed evenhandedly under the same regime.”81
Under a less charitable interpretation, term extension has always been
driven by its retroactive potential – its potential for maintaining the
flow of a proven income stream that would otherwise cease
immediately. The prospective aspect of term extension concerns an
income stream that may or may not exist decades in the future. As
Justice Breyer pointed out in dissent in Eldred, under conservative
assumptions about discount rates, the prospective extension of term
from life plus 50 to life plus 70 increases the present value of a work
79

A competitor for the title of greatest retroactive extension of copyright term might
be the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No 103-465, § 514 (December 8, 1994),
108 Stat. 4809, 4976, which restored copyright in a large number of foreign works that
had fallen into the public domain in the United States due to publication without
proper copyright notice or failure to file an application to renew.
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when created by only one-third of one percent; even that assumes that
the income stream from the work remains constant, as it does in only a
very small percentage of cases.82 And as I have noted elsewhere, even
though publishers argued that U.S. copyright term should be extended
so that U.S. works would gain protection for life plus 70 in Europe, they
generally seem to be simultaneously publishing U.S. works in Canada,
which under Berne Convention rules will in many cases limit European
protection for those works to life plus 50.83 That in turn suggests that
those publishers are not very interested in prospective term extension.
If it is the prospect of retroactive extension that has motivated the
increase in copyright term, then it may be the prospective extension
that is the afterthought, motivated less by equality than by avoiding the
perception of naked greed.
Will the retrospective maximum term of copyright ever again
equal the prospectively announced term? The first works created with
the expectation that they would receive a term of life of the author plus
70 years were created on October 27, 1998. Those works will not fall
into the public domain until at least January 1, 2069, and that will be
the case only for a small percentage of those works, namely, those
whose authors died by December 31, 1998. Nonetheless, if Congress
does not in the meantime again retroactively extend copyright term,
some group may prepare to toast at midnight on New Year’s Eve, 2068,
the return of coincidence between prospective and retrospective
maximum copyright term. Whoever proposes the toast on that
occasion may note that the last time that works began entering the
public domain after a term that was announced at the time they gained
federal copyright protection was midnight on February 2, 1873, when
works for which copyright was acquired under the 1831 Act and
properly renewed began to fall into the public domain.84 By any mortal
measure, that is a long interlude.
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